The threat of counter-revolution is real. But so is stagnation

In the aftermath of Bashar al-Assad’s fall, Syria’s new leadership has found itself confronting a complex dilemma: how to consolidate the revolution’s victory against the ever-present threat of counter-revolution, while also rebuilding the state without tumbling into chaos or political coups. The bitter lessons of the Arab Spring loom large. Across the region, revolutions that failed to dismantle entrenched elites saw those very elites return: more ruthless, more disciplined, and better organised than before.

Syria’s transitional phase is particularly sensitive. The long war has left deep political and social fissures. In such a climate, even a misjudged gesture can squander hard-won gains or create openings for hostile forces to exploit. The balance between “political fortification” against counter-revolutionary forces and continued openness to society has therefore become extraordinarily delicate.

Egypt offers a cautionary tale. After Hosni Mubarak stepped down in February 2011, the so-called “deep state” was never dismantled. The army, security apparatus, judiciary and media largely retained their positions. Liberal and technocratic figures who had previously worked within the regime were reabsorbed under the banners of utilising those with “experience” and promoting “stability” and “continuity”. Within two years, the military had returned to full control in the aftermath of the July 2013 coup. This time more cohesive and more unforgiving. 

Libya presents a different, though equally instructive, example. There, the incorporation of security and tribal figures from Muammar Gaddafi’s regime helped preserve a measure of administrative and security continuity. But the country’s regional fragmentation and tribal rivalries prevented the re-emergence of a single, dominant centre of power. While former regime networks retained local influence, the old order never reconstituted itself as decisively as it did in Egypt. 

Drawing on those lessons, many have welcomed the limitations placed on some regime-era elites when it comes to being appointed to high office. The state bureaucracy, however, is still staffed by regime-era appointees, and continues to function and exert significant influence. Meanwhile, opposition elites continue to be side-lined. In recent months this has led to voices of criticism getting louder from the exclusion of secular intellectuals and veteran opposition figures from government jobs. Among them are those who played central roles in the 2011 uprising, including founders of the Syrian National Council and the Syrian National Coalition.

Syria’s new leadership appears to regard the revolutionary elites as remnants of another “regime” and excluding them as a smart pre-emptive measure. These elites, for all their revolutionary credentials, are seen by Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) as potential conduits for division or infiltration, and an opening through which the fledgling state might be weakened.

Analysts have interpreted this policy as a deliberate distinction between the state and the regime: incorporating administrative and economic expertise from the old regime as a means of safeguarding state institutions, while excluding revolutionary and opposition elites is presented as a temporary precaution to prevent the emergence of an alternative “regime” that might capture the state or plunge it into internal conflict.

Within this framework, a number of protective steps have been undertaken: postponing comprehensive elections to avoid the corrosive effects of sectarian mobilisation and political money; restructuring the security apparatus to prevent the kind of collapse witnessed in Iraq after 2003; and toning down ideological rhetoric in favour of language centred on sovereignty, stability and reconstruction.

Yet herein lies the central risk. A temporary logic of precaution can all too easily harden into a permanent architecture of exclusion. A revolution that began as a political awakening could ossify into a technocratic administration devoid of genuine politics.

Syria’s future should in part be measured by whether the new leadership can gradually integrate the broader anti-Assad political class into state structures. Success will require the gradual inclusion of civil society, anti-Assad intellectuals, and political and cultural elites in the state and in broader decision-making. This should be done in a manner that secures genuine representation and institutional resilience, while guarding against the kinds of infiltration that could undermine the revolution’s core principles and the integrity of the new state. If the leadership manages this balance, Syria may yet chart a path distinct from other Arab uprisings.