We need to talk about corruption

In a recent conversation, a relative recounted his experience navigating routine bureaucratic procedures: bribes are still expected, rules still bent, and official processes still circumvented with ease. Corruption, far from receding, continues to shape the everyday functioning of public institutions.

One might have assumed that corruption would at least diminish under the transitional government led by President Ahmed al-Sharaa. A reasonable estimate, perhaps, would be that it had halved. Yet a civil servant working within a ministry offers a starkly different account: “in my department, corruption has doubled.”

The explanation is both simple and troubling.

The new government has drawn much of its leadership from similar political and ideological backgrounds. What it lacks, critics argue, is the technocratic expertise required to rebuild a country devastated across every sector: economic, educational, security and diplomatic.

Meanwhile, many experienced and reputable professionals have been sidelined. Their absence has had predictable consequences. Without the necessary expertise, new officials struggle to manage resources effectively or to detect and prevent corruption. Instead, they become dependent on existing networks that often operate through informal arrangements and entrenched malpractice.

The weakness of oversight bodies only compounds the issue. Regulatory and auditing institutions lack both the experience and capacity to identify violations, allowing long-established patterns of corruption to persist largely unchecked. For ordinary citizens – and for honest public servants – this fosters a growing sense of frustration and disillusionment.

Nor is the problem confined to administrative offices. Reports of bribery within traffic police units, as described by public transport drivers, suggest that corruption permeates multiple layers of the state apparatus.

The scale of the challenge has been acknowledged at the highest level. The president himself has conceded that the corruption and institutional damage inherited from the previous regime are extensive and will take considerable time to address. It is a rare admission of the depth and complexity of the problem.

Yet government shortcomings have compounded the difficulty. Hastily issued decrees and poorly considered regulations have, in many cases, added layers of confusion to an already strained administrative system. Efforts at reform are frequently undermined by inconsistency and lack of coordination.

Economic realities further exacerbate the situation. Low public sector wages, insufficient to meet basic living costs, leave many employees vulnerable to the temptations of bribery.

If Syria is to recover, tackling corruption must be central to its reconstruction. Rhetorical commitment is not enough, this demands structural reform.

First, competent and qualified professionals must be brought back into public service, replacing those whose records are tainted by corruption. Second, oversight and accountability mechanisms must be strengthened to ensure that violations are both detected and punished. Third, legal frameworks must be updated and enforced to address corruption in a systematic and credible manner.

Equally important is addressing the socio-economic drivers of corruption. Poverty, inadequate wages and excessive bureaucracy all contribute to an environment in which illicit practices are tolerated. Without tackling these root causes, reform efforts are unlikely to succeed.