How can trust be built between Damascus and the Kurds today?

It is almost a truism that building trust between governments and peoples is far too important to be reduced to grand speeches or hollow declarations. The familiar rhetoric of “national unity” and “shared destiny” rings particularly thin in a country emerging from a long and deeply divisive war. Against this backdrop, the relationship between Syria’s new government and its Kurdish population now faces a genuine test, as implementation of the 29 January agreement with the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) is ongoing.

There are, as yet, no clear signs that the agreement is failing. On the contrary, its provisions appear to be advancing at pace, underscoring a visible determination on both sides to see it through – particularly its military dimension, which centres on integrating SDF fighters into state institutions. For Damascus, this is framed as a step towards restoring the unity of state structures, ending the multiplicity of armed actors that emerged during the war, and reasserting control across the country’s territory.

For the Kurds, it is a test of intent. Having experienced a form of self-administration during the war years – long a cornerstone of Kurdish political aspirations – they are now being asked to place their trust in a state that has historically fallen short of accommodating those ambitions.

The road to trust is anything but straightforward. The first major obstacle is the issue of detainees. According to official statements by SDF commander Mazloum Abdi, more than 1,070 SDF fighters remain in government custody as prisoners of war, most of them Kurdish. Their families protest daily, seeking answers about their fate.

This unresolved issue raises uncomfortable questions. How can one speak of integration while members of the same force remain imprisoned? Should not such integration include them? For many in Kurdish society, their release is not merely a legal matter but a political signal: proof that the era of conflict has truly come to an end.

A second challenge concerns the tens of thousands displaced from Ras al-Ayn and Tal Abyad. The overwhelming majority of Kurdish residents who fled these areas remain unable to return to homes that have been seized, along with agricultural lands and other properties. While the government speaks of facilitating the return of all displaced persons as part of a broader stabilisation effort, reality tells a different story.

This disconnect reinforces a lingering perception among many Kurds: that the new state remains either unwilling or unable to reverse the facts on the ground created during the war years.

A third, and no less sensitive, factor is Turkey’s influence in the Syrian file. For many Kurds, some of Damascus’s decisions regarding Kurdish-majority areas appear entangled in regional calculations that extend beyond Syria itself, particularly in relation to Ras al-Ayn and Tal Abyad. These cities remain under Turkish control, administratively tied to Ankara, leaving the Syrian government with little apparent leverage.

In this context, the question becomes: can the Syrian state take independent decisions on matters affecting its own citizens? Would Turkey tolerate genuine decentralisation if Damascus were to endorse it? And if Ankara refused, would Damascus stand its ground?

The issue of Afrin further compounds these anxieties. Thousands of Kurdish families have lost their homes and lands there, with no clear indication yet that restitution is forthcoming. Political agreements may speak of the return of all residents, but daily realities offer little evidence of a credible pathway to resolve such a deeply complex issue. A first wave of returnees has indeed taken place, but critical questions remain: how will property be restored, and who will remove the militias and factions currently in control?

Conditions in the Kurdish-majority Sheikh Maqsoud and Ashrafieh neighbourhoods of Aleppo reflect a similar dynamic. Many residents feel that their relationship with state institutions continues to be governed by a security-first approach, rather than one rooted in political partnership or even basic civic inclusion. This only deepens scepticism among Kurds who had hoped the agreement with the SDF would mark the beginning of a different chapter.

Then there is Decree No. 13, which has added yet another layer of contention. While the government presents it as a meaningful step towards organising administrative and cultural relations with Kurdish areas, many Kurds see it as largely cosmetic and falling well short of addressing core political demands such as decentralisation, the future of local governance, and the enduring legacy of the former regime in Kurdish regions.

In the end, none of these issues are insurmountable. But resolving them will require more than administrative measures or symbolic gestures. It will demand a clear and sustained political will from Damascus that demonstrates the agreement with the SDF is not merely a temporary military arrangement, but the foundation of a genuinely new relationship with Syria’s Kurdish community.